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Mass Layoffs and CEO Turnover
 
SHERRILYN M. BILLGER and KEVIN F. HALLOCK
 
We investigate the relationship between layoff announcements and CEO turnover
over a 31-year period. We find that layoffs significantly increase CEO turnover
in the following year, and, in some time periods, CEO changes are strongly
positively associated with layoff announcements two years earlier. We proceed
to show how this relationship has changed over time, and offer several possible
explanations. Finally, we find strong evidence that layoffs that are associated
with negative stock price reactions are much more likely to lead to CEO turnover
than those associated with positive stock price reactions, especially in the earlier
years in our sample.
 
I
 
        
 
 CEO
 
      
 
. While positive
relative stock returns certainly signal “good” performance, the role of mass
layoffs is not similarly obvious. For example, a major layoff announcement
can be a positive sign that a struggling company is serious about reorgani-
zation and making efforts to improve profitability. On the other hand, mass
layoffs could also represent the last-ditch efforts by CEOs to keep their jobs.
As job loss announcements and executive turnover represent relatively
high-stakes outcomes, we focus on the relationship between mass job loss
announcements and top management turnover in an attempt to explore
these ideas more thoroughly. This project is a careful consideration of mass
layoffs and their specific, although likely varied, impacts on a central com-
ponent of the executive labor market, namely turnover. Indeed, some CEOs
are expected to lay off  employees in certain situations, and we attempt to
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determine whether CEOs are acting as their boards expect (and want), or
if  the layoffs signal the ultimate failure of the executive with that firm.
There is currently a great deal of interest in the layoffs and their conse-
quences for both employees and for firms.
 
1
 
 Work on the effects on workers
has continued for some time. An excellent recent example in this area is
that by Farber (2003). In the past few years, economists have turned their
attention to outcomes for firms. This work has included examples that study
the relationship between job loss and establishment (Cappelli, 2000) or
firm performance (Dial and Murphy, 1995), job loss announcements and
stock prices (Farber and Hallock, 2003), or more generally, the causes and
consequences of “downsizing” (Baumol, Blinder, and Wolff, 2003).
One of the important outcomes for firms is related to the CEO. Using a
much smaller sample than that which we use here, Hallock (1998) investigated
the relationship between layoff announcements in large firms, and CEO
compensation in those same firms (described in succeeding discussions). We
consider it also interesting to investigate another important aspect of the
CEO labor market: turnover. CEOs have a great deal of discretion in setting
the strategy for their firms, and because it is perfectly reasonable for them
to want to stay in their positions, they are likely to manage firms in ways
that should allow them to stay in office.
This paper will therefore empirically investigate whether CEOs are
rewarded (by keeping their jobs) or punished (as measured by turnover) for
directing mass layoffs of workers. We will also study whether this relation-
ship changes over time, and whether it is independent of the reaction of
individual firm stock prices to layoff announcements.
We begin by documenting the relationship between firm performance
and executive turnover using one data set covering a longer time period than
contained in previous studies. We also attempt to detect possible changes
in turnover, and the performance/turnover relationship from 1970 through
2000. We find that for the firms in our sample, CEO turnover has increased
over time, but the relationship between turnover and stock returns has been
relatively consistent. We then examine the impact of job loss announcements
on the likelihood of turnover. Depending on the time period in question,
conditional upon firm and CEO characteristics, we find some evidence that
layoff announcements are positively associated with the probability a CEO
will leave the firm.
Layoffs are positively associated with the probability of CEO turnover
throughout all decades in our data, but the relationship varies in significance.
We find some significant evidence that job loss announcements negatively
 
1
 
 We are grateful to a referee for several suggestions that have helped us to motivate the paper.
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affected executive turnover during the 1970s. That is, CEOs were less likely
to separate from firms after making layoff announcements. In the 1980s,
however, any layoff increases the likelihood of a CEO change two years in the
future by nearly 8 percent, depending on the empirical specification. This
relationship is not significantly different from zero in the 1990s, however.
We then discuss possible explanations for these findings, including an exami-
nation of the specific characteristics of the layoffs. For instance, the stated
reasons for layoffs have changed over time, with increasingly fewer instances
of “low demand” and more of “efficiency” reasons. This could affect the
perceptions of whether layoffs are indicators of problems or improvements,
thus impacting top management turnover.
Because it seems reasonable to categorize the layoffs into whether the
market perceived them as “good” news or as “bad” news, we also examine
whether the short-term stock price reaction to layoff announcements has
any effect on these relationships. We find strong evidence that layoffs that are
associated with negative stock price reactions are much more likely to lead
to CEO turnover than layoffs associated with positive stock price reactions.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the first section, we discuss previous
literature on the relationship between firm performance and executive turn-
over, and then focus on job loss announcements. We briefly describe the
previous work on CEO turnover in large firms, as well as the effects of job
loss announcements on firms. The second section identifies the data we use
in our study. These data include detailed information on firms, CEOs, and
layoff announcements, and are compiled from a variety of sources. In the
third section, we provide empirical results for the relationship between firm
performance and turnover during the extensive time period covered by our
data. The next section examines job loss announcements, and documents
the estimated relationship between such announcements and CEO turnover.
In the fifth section, we discuss possible explanations for our results on the
relationship between mass layoff announcements and management turnover,
including an examination of reported reasons. Section six is an examination
of whether the short-term stock price reaction to job loss announcements
can help explain CEO turnover. Concluding remarks and suggestions for
future research are presented in the last section.
 
Recent Work on Management Turnover and Job Loss 
Announcements
 
There is a substantial literature on the effects of firm performance on
management turnover in the United States and in other countries, beginning
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with Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), who showed that the probability of
management turnover declines as stock price improves. Later, researchers
also began to study the effects of job loss announcements on firm outcomes.
We will describe previous studies that focus on either executive turnover or
mass layoffs, continuing with a discussion of how we will extend the litera-
ture by combining these issues.
 
Firm Performance and CEO Turnover.
 
2
 
Simple agency theory is often
used to describe the compensation of  top managers of  firms. That is,
compensation plans are designed to align the interests of self-interested
managers with those of the shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932 and Jensen
and Meckling, 1976). The same ideas can be extended to turnover. If
managers are earning more than their opportunity cost, the threat of firing
provides incentives to align the interests of shareholders with the managers.
Although we know from Vancil (1987), Weisbach (1988), and others that
top managers of firms are rarely publicly fired, there does seem to be a
strong relationship between the performance of a firm and the probability
that the top manager will turnover.
 
3
 
 A great deal of attention has been paid
to the link between CEO pay and company performance, and this can be
extended to CEO turnover. If  a CEO performs poorly, he loses his job.
As more data on top executives are now available, many of the analyses that
originally studied the link between pay and performance switched to
studying the link between CEO turnover and firm performance. Several of
the most influential of these studies are discussed here.
Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) examine the link between lagged stock
returns and CEO turnover. They use a sample of top management changes
from 1963 through 1978. They find that as firm performance declines, the
probability of a change in top management increases. They do point out,
however, that the performance must be unusually high or low to detect these
differences empirically. Weisbach (1988) uses data on the characteristics of
boards of directors, firms, and changes in the CEO for several hundred
large firms from the 1970s through the early 1980s. Consistent with Warner,
Watts, and Wruck (1988), he finds a connection between poor firm perfor-
mance and CEO resignations that remains after controlling for industry,
firm size, and firm ownership.
 
4
 
 Additional work by Kaplan (1994a,b) and
Conyon (1998) explored CEO turnover in other countries.
 
2
 
 This subsection is based, in part, on Hallock and Murphy (1999).
 
3
 
 See Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Gilson (1989), Denis and Denis (1995), Hadlock and Lumer
(1997), Mikkelson and Partch (1997), Parrino (1997) and Huson, Parrino, and Sparks (1998).
 
4
 
 This result is stronger in firms dominated by outside directors than for firms dominated by insiders.
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Job Loss Announcements and Firm Outcomes.
 
There is a growing litera-
ture on the effects of job loss announcements on firm outcomes, including
firm stock price and CEO pay, and our work thus adds to the general
discovery of the relationship between job loss announcements and firm
outcomes. Hallock (1998) investigates the relationship between job loss
announcements and CEO pay using a sample of large U.S. firms and data
from 1987 to 1995. He finds that firms that announce layoffs in the previous
year pay their CEOs more, and give their top managers larger percentage
raises than firms which do not have at least one layoff announcement in the
previous year. He also finds, though, that the likelihood of a firm announc-
ing a layoff in a given year is related to one of the most important correlates
of CEO pay—firm size (as measured, for example, by the log of the market
value of equity). After controlling for observed and unobserved character-
istics of the firm, the CEO’s pay premium for laying off  workers disappears.
 
5
 
Farber and Hallock (2004) study the short-term stock price reaction to
job loss announcements using data from 1970 to 1999. They find clear
evidence that the share price reaction to job loss announcements has
become less negative over time. A potential reason for this is that the frac-
tion of job loss announcements related to “deficient demand” reasons
(which would tend to drive prices down) has decreased relative to the frac-
tion resulting from “efficiency” reasons (which would likely be better news
for stock prices) over time. However, the authors find that most of the
changes in share price reactions to job loss announcements over the sample
remain unexplained.
 
Data
 
The data for this paper are collected from several distinct sources. The data
on management turnover from 1970 to 1991 are from 
 
Forbes
 
 magazine’s
Annual Compensation Issues and the 1992–2000 data are from Standard &
Poor’s E
 

 
C
 

 
. We have two sources of accounting and financial infor-
mation for the firms. We collected annual accounting and other financial
information from Standard and Poor’s C
 

 
 and compute annual
rates of return to firms’ common stock from data from the Center for
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago. Finally,
the data on job loss announcements are collected from 
 
Wall Street Journal
 
abstracts and articles.
 
5
 
 Hallock (1998) also finds a weak negative stock price reaction to layoff announcements. Farber and
Hallock (2004) provide a summary of papers that find a similar relationship.
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CEOs.
 
Kevin J. Murphy and Cecily Fluke provided the information on
CEOs that was used to construct our basic measures of CEO turnover for the
years 1970–1991. In both cases, the data were originally collected by Forbes
magazine, and details on CEOs and their pay structure are published in the
 
Forbes
 
’ annual compensation issue for a set of roughly 800 firms per year.
 
6
 
For the remaining years, we use Standard & Poor’s E
 

 
C
 

 
 to calculate
turnover. Our base sample includes all firms in the sample from 1970 to 2000.
We display descriptive statistics from these samples in the top panel of
Table 1. Our measure of CEO turnover is equal to 1 if  there is a change in
the name of the CEO in the next year.
 
7
 
 We see in Table 1 that, on average,
12.2 percent of firms have a new CEO in a given year. Figure 1 plots the
 
6
 
 A wide variety of papers have used 
 
Forbes
 
 data to research CEO pay and turnover (e.g. Jensen and
Murphy, 1990). More recent papers on CEO pay have not used 
 
Forbes
 
 data since 
 
Forbes
 
 has not
systematically reported the valuation of stock options over time (see Hall and Liebman, 1998 for a
recent example of a paper that does value options). However, since the focus of this paper is on turnover
and not pay, this data problem is not an issue for us.
 
7
 
 There may be some instances, especially with the 
 
Forbes
 
 data, where a CEO will join and depart
(perhaps an “interim” CEO) in the same fiscal year. Given our data, we will miss these occurrences.
TABLE 1
S M  L S
 
All firms
No layoff 
announcements 
in year t
At least one
Layoff in year t
Absolute 
value of
t statistic
CEO turnover
New CEO in year t + 1 0.122 
(0.004)
0.118 
(0.004)
0.143 
(0.010)
2.267
CEO characteristics
Age 57.697 
(0.068)
57.578 
(0.073)
57.824 
(0.182)
0.745
Tenure with firm 25.338 
(0.126)
25.292 
(0.134)
25.647 
(0.359)
0.925
Tenure as CEO 7.862 
(0.075)
8.031 
(0.082)
6.731 
(0.187)
6.372
Firm characteristics
Market value of equity a 
(millions)
4741.334
(122.129)
4324.67 
(120.98)
7531.80 
(468.47)
6.629
Total number of 
employeesb (thousands)
37.555
(0.663)
31.494 
(0.575)
77.497 
(3.122)
14.494
Number of unique firms 500
Number of observations 8690 7561 1129
The data were gathered from Wall Street Journal abstracts, C, CRSP, and Forbes.
Standard errors appear in parentheses.
ain inflation-adjusted 1990 dollars.
bThe number of observations for this variable is 8569.
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mean of the turnover variable for each year from 1970 to 2000. The figure
shows that the rate of turnover has increased somewhat over time, but is
quite variable as well. Also plotted in Figure 1 is a least-squares line fitted
through the annual average turnover data that further highlights the increase
over time. Table 1 also reports that the average firm’s CEO is 58 years old,
has been with his firm for 25 years, and has been CEO for 8 years. These
characteristics are consistent with a host of previous studies.
 
Firms.
 
C
 

 
 and Center for Research in Security Prices “CRSP” are
the sources for the annual firm characteristic data. The second part of Table 1
reports the mean market value of the firm (calculated as the price per share
times the total number of shares, reported in millions of 1990 dollars), and
the average number of employees for each firm (reported in thousands) from
1970 through 2000. The averages for these variables for the sample period
were $4.74 billion and 37,555, respectively.
 
Layoff Announcements.
 
The layoff data were collected by first reading the
abstracts from the 
 
Wall Street Journal
 
 index, and then by reading the full-
length articles in the 
 
Wall Street Journal
 
 (as described in succeeding discussion).
We created our job loss announcement sample by identifying each firm that
FIGURE 1
CEO T  Y
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ever existed in the 
 
Fortune
 
 500 from 1970–2000. This generated a list of 1849
different firm names over the sample period. For each year, we then searched
for any record of a job loss announcement within the company name sections
of each of the 
 
Wall Street Journal
 
 indexes over the sample period. When an
announcement was found, we recorded the date of the announcement, and
where available, several other pieces of information (discussed further) includ-
ing the number of workers involved in the layoff, the “reason” for the layoff,
whether it was temporary or permanent, and whether it involved a foreign
subsidiary. The reason we used a paper source such as the 
 
Wall Street Journal
 
index and not an electronic source is because, at the time the data were
collected, no electronic source would allow us to search as far back as 1970, and
we wanted to use as consistent a sample as possible throughout the entire
time period.
 
8
 
 Because we felt that we did not have sufficiently detailed infor-
mation at this point, we returned to the more than 4000 individual job loss
announcements and read the full-length articles on each. For example, when
reading only the abstracts, we were able to identify “reasons” for layoffs for
just over two-thirds of the observations. However, after reading the full-length
articles, we were able to do this for greater than 97 percent of the observations.
The data collection on layoffs alone took roughly 3000 hours.
If  in a given year, no articles were found for a given firm in the sample,
that firm was assigned zero layoff announcements. There are certainly
potential problems with using data from a source such as the 
 
Wall Street
Journal
 
 (see Thompson, Olsen, and Dietrich, 1987). For example, it may be
the case that either not all RIFs are announced in the 
 
Wall Street Journal
 
,
or that the journal chooses not to report all events. However, we believe that
most job loss events in these firms are reported in the 
 
Wall Street Journal
 
index for at least two reasons. First, because the basic sample is the 
 
Fortune
500
 
—roughly the largest and most visible firms in the United States—it is
reasonable to assume that the 
 
Wall Street Journal
 
 would cover most news
stories about these firms. Secondly, there is substantial evidence of very
small job loss announcements reported (e.g., as few as eight or ten workers).
The fraction of firms with at least one layoff per year has varied over time,
but generally follows the state of the economy, as seen in Figure 2. See
Hallock (2003) for much more detail on the job loss announcement data.
Clearly, the job loss announcement data can be used at the level of
 
each
 
 announcement. In fact, our base sample contains more than 4200
individual announcements. However, because there can be multiple job loss
announcements in a given firm in a given year, and our CEO turnover data
 
8
 
 The tabulations we report and use in this paper compare favorably with Hallock (1998) who has
completed the largest previous study (using data from 1987–1995) using an electronic source.
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are annual, we primarily focus on aggregate data within a fiscal year.
 
9
 
 That
is, our unit of observation is a firm-year. Table 1 reveals that of the 8690 firm-
years in our combined CEO/firm/layoff  sample, 1129 (or approximately
13 percent) included at least one job loss announcement.
 
10
 
As shown in the middle two columns in Table 1, some of  the basic
characteristics of CEOs and firms vary somewhat by whether there is at
least one layoff in the firm. For example, firms that have at least one layoff
are more likely to have a new CEO in the following year (14.3 percent of
firms versus 11.8 percent). Similarly, firms with at least one layoff in the
current year have CEOs who have about 1.3 fewer years seniority in that
position. In addition, firms with at least one layoff announcement in the
previous year are larger. For example, the average market value of the firm
 
9
 
 All data are reported for fiscal years.
 
10 Although we started with 1849 different firm names from each firm that ever existed in the Fortune
500 in any year from 1970–2001, it is clear from Table 1 that we only have complete information on
500 firms. This is because of two reasons. First, firms have name changes over time so that a unique firm
may be associated with multiple firm names over time. The second reason is that not all firms for which
we have data on layoff announcements have matching information in the Forbes, EC, C,
or CRSP samples.
FIGURE 2
F F  L  U R
472 / S M. B  K F. H
for the group with at least one layoff is almost double the average for the
group with no layoff during the year. The same is true for the number of
employees in the firm. We investigate these relationships more carefully in
further discussions. We now turn to basic relationships between firm perfor-
mance and management turnover.
Firm Performance and Management Turnover
Baseline Specifications. As found in previous studies, we expect that poor
firm performance increases the probability that a CEO will turnover, all else
being equal. It is important to confirm that our basic specifications are similar
to those of other authors for a few different reasons. First, we want to be sure
that the specifications can be compared to other work. Second, this baseline
work will help us consider important measures of firm performance that will
be important to other parts of the paper. We use stock returns to measure per-
formance, which also allows for easy comparison to similar studies. We include
both firm and market returns in order to control for relative performance.11
The motivation behind using relative performance is that CEOs are not
extensively affected by random factors. For instance, an economy-wide
recession should not, in and of itself, cause the top manager to be dis-
missed. Antle and Smith (1986) focus on 39 firms from 1947 to 1977, and
find that a firm’s performance relative to other firms in the same industry
is significantly related to CEO compensation. This is true for return on
assets, but not for stock returns. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) use data for
1049 companies from 1974 to 1986 to examine the role of relative perfor-
mance in determining top management compensation and turnover. They
find that greater own-firm returns increase compensation and decrease the
likelihood of a CEO change, while market returns decrease compensation
and increase the probability of turnover.
In addition to controls for relative firm performance, we include the log
of the market value of equity as a measure of firm size. Finally, CEO charac-
teristics are essential to estimating the probability of turnover. To this end
we include controls for age, tenure with the firm, and tenure as CEO.12 The
11 Market returns were constructed as average returns across all firms in the sample for that year,
excluding the relevant firm. Note that because of this construction, controlling for year effects (with
indicator variables) is problematic. This is because (except for the exclusion of the single relevant firm
each time) the measure of market return is almost perfectly predicted by a year indicator variable.
12 In results not reported here, we also included an indicator variable equal to one in the CEO’s first
2 years of tenure as CEO. This had no meaningful impact on the performance variables.
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full specification is then a logit regression of the probability of CEO turnover
on a set of characteristics of the firm and the CEO:
Probability of CEO turnover = F (β(own returns)it + δ (market returns)t 
+ γ ln(market value)it + φ(CEO characteristics) + αi + εit), (1)
where i represents firms, t represents years, and CEO turnover equals 1
in the CEO’s last year (year t) and equals 0 otherwise. F (•) represents the
logistic cumulative distribution function used in logit analysis. In some
specifications, we control for own returns and market returns for three time
periods: t − 2, t − 1, and t. The vector of CEO characteristics is comprised of
quadratic variables for age, tenure with the firm, and tenure as CEO. Also
note the composite error term, αi + εit, which contains possible permanent
firm effects (which we explore below).
We have performed this estimation using a logit specification, although
the results are similar when we use a probit or a linear probability model.
One drawback of using our empirical approach is heteroscedasticity. We
have run all regressions using White/Robust standard errors to control for
this, but found no meaningful differences in significance levels.
Baseline logit results for the probability of CEO turnover conditional on
observed firm and CEO characteristics are in Table 2.13 Columns 1 through
3 include only performance measures as controls. Higher own returns in
period t and t − 1 consistently (and significantly) decrease the probability
of turnover, while market returns generally increase the probability of turn-
over, though the coefficients are often insignificant. That is, conditional on
market returns, when a firm performs poorly, the CEO is more likely to be
changed.
Adding CEO characteristics (in columns 4 and 5) greatly increases the
explanatory power of these regressions. As expected, older CEOs are much
more likely to turn over, relative to younger CEOs. Additional years of
tenure with the firm slightly decrease the probability of turnover, and at an
increasing rate. Additional years as CEO have the opposite effect, increas-
ing the probability of turnover at a decreasing rate.
To examine the role of unobservable firm characteristics in turnover, we
include firm fixed effects, αi, in the last column of  Table 2. Firm effects
have not been widely explored in previous work. The motivation is to
test whether own and market returns truly exhibit the effect described, or
that the result is simply masking other unobserved variables attributable
to firms. Controlling for firm fixed effects has little impact on the other
13 Marginal effects are reported. P values associated with robust variance estimates for the coefficients
appear in parentheses.
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covariates, except for lessening the negative impact of contemporaneous own
returns on CEO turnover. In sum, these results confirm the previously
documented relationship between firm performance and executive turnover,
but for a longer time period.
Are there Differences by Decade? It is interesting to consider whether the
empirical results are consistent across time. To examine whether the deter-
minants of CEO turnover have changed over time, we divide our data into
three decades, and present these results in Table 3. The first three columns
focus on 1970–1979. These columns include the same set of  variables as
TABLE 2
L R  P  CEO T
 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Own returns)t −0.047***
(0.000)
−0.051***
(0.000)
−0.053***
(0.000)
−0.040***
(0.000)
−0.028***
(0.000)
(Own returns)t−1 −0.033***
(0.006)
−0.035***
(0.004)
−0.026***
(0.009)
−0.023***
(0.001)
(Own returns)t−2 −0.016 
(0.171)
−0.011 
(0.236)
−0.017***
(0.003)
(Market returns)t 0.032 
(0.113)
0.032 
(0.112)
0.031 
(0.144)
0.021 
(0.218)
0.022*
(0.060)
(Market returns)t−1 −0.011 
(0.598)
−0.010 
(0.607)
−0.010 
(0.511)
0.002 
(0.847)
(Market returns)t−2 0.008 
(0.720)
−0.004 
(0.800)
0.003 
(0.792)
ln(market value) −0.003 
(0.211)
−0.001 
(0.733)
Age 0.045***
(0.000)
−0.051*** 
(0.000)
Age2/1000 −0.284***
(0.000)
0.534*** 
(0.000)
Tenure with firm −0.002** 
(0.042)
−0.001 
(0.542)
(Tenure with firm)2/1000 0.053*** 
(0.005)
0.045***
(0.082)
Tenure as CEO 0.004*** 
(0.000)
0.006***
(0.000)
(Tenure as CEO)2/1000 −0.116*** 
(0.001)
−0.162***
(0.000)
Firm indicators Yes
No. of observations 8690 8690 8690 8690 8690
Pseudo R2 0.0024 0.0042 0.0045 0.1102 0.2513
A CEO change is when there is one CEO with the firm in year t and another in year t + 1.
Marginal effects are reported. p values associated with robust variance estimates for coefficients appear in parentheses.
All logits were run with a constant term.
***significant at the 1 percent level, **significant at the 5 percent level, *significant at the 10 percent level.
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TABLE 3
L R  P  CEO T  D
1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–1999
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Own returns)t −0.085*** 
(0.004)
−0.082*** 
(0.002)
−0.048*** 
(0.000)
−0.063** 
(0.039)
−0.055** 
(0.038)
−0.017* 
(0.074)
−0.024
(0.422)
−0.011
(0.715)
0.001 
(0.817)
(Own returns)t−1 −0.047* 
(0.067)
−0.052** 
(0.028)
−0.043*** 
(0.001)
−0.028 
(0.318)
−0.031 
(0.208)
−0.012 
(0.184)
−0.043
(0.178)
−0.033
(0.256)
−0.0002 
(0.947)
(Own returns)t−2 −0.002 
(0.923)
−0.007 
(0.737)
−0.017 
(0.110)
−0.010 
(0.708)
−0.017 
(0.455)
−0.009 
(0.235)
−0.044
(0.154)
−0.045
(0.114)
−0.005** 
(0.026)
(Market returns)t 0.007 
(0.888)
0.036 
(0.385)
0.026 
(0.163)
0.095 
(0.327)
0.143* 
(0.072)
0.081** 
(0.013)
−0.027
(0.691)
−0.034
(0.569)
0.002 
(0.629)
(Market returns)t−1 0.001 
(0.979)
0.024 
(0.479)
0.040*** 
(0.006)
−0.225** 
(0.031)
−0.112 
(0.189)
−0.005 
(0.895)
0.084
(0.326)
0.070
(0.358)
0.006 
(0.235)
(Market returns)t−2 −0.064 
(0.163)
−0.041 
(0.295)
−0.026 
(0.149)
−0.012 
(0.907)
0.026 
(0.759)
0.036 
(0.259)
0.111
(0.164)
0.098
(0.163)
0.008 
(0.128)
ln(market value) −0.011* 
(0.057)
−0.019 
(0.118)
−0.006 
(0.364)
−0.008 
(0.495)
0.006
(0.451)
−0.0006 
(0.861)
CEO characteristicsa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm indicators Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 2457 2457 2457 2266 2266 2266 1652 1652 1652
Pseudo R2 0.0074 0.1277 0.3577 0.0109 0.1226 0.3854 0.0038 0.0997 0.5148
A CEO change is when there is one CEO with the firm in year t and another in year t + 1.
Marginal effects are reported. p values associated with robust variance estimates for coefficients appear in parentheses. All logits were run with a constant term.
***significant at the 1 percent level, **significant at the 5 percent level, *significant at the 10 percent level.
aCEO characteristics include age and its square, seniority with firm and its square, and seniority as CEO and its square.
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columns 4–6 in Table 2. For the 1970s, contemporaneous and one-year
lagged own returns are significant determinants of turnover, even when firm
fixed effects are added in column 3. These estimated coefficients can be
further compared to those for 1980–1989 in columns 4–6 of Table 3.
According to these results, own returns also significantly affect the prob-
ability of CEO turnover, but lagged returns do not. Thus far, it appears that
performance in a CEO’s last and second to the last years mattered most in
the 1970s, while the performance in the last year mattered most in the 1980s.
The last three columns of Table 3 contain the logit results for 1990–1999.14
Here own returns do not significantly decrease the probability of turnover.
Our findings are consistent with earlier studies on the relationship between
share performance and top management turnover. Warner, Watts, and Wruck
(1988) find that lower stock prices increase the probability of turnover using
data from 1963 to 1978. Weisbach (1988) also uses data from the late 1970s
and comes to a similar conclusion. Parrino (1997) finds a negative relation-
ship between CEO turnover and firm performance for the 1970s and 1980s,
although he does not differentiate between the decades as we do. It is only
in the 1990s (which these authors did not study) that we do not find these
relationships. Denis and Denis (1995) focus on forced turnover and find
that its likelihood increases with negative share performance in the late
1980s. Mikkelson and Partch (1997) obtain a result particularly relevant to
our work. They find that lower stock returns increase top management
turnover in 1984 through 1988, but do not have a significant effect from
1989 to 1993, which is consistent with our findings.
The Relationship Between Management Turnover and Job Loss 
Announcements
As described previously, increasing attention is being placed on the relation-
ship between job loss and outcomes, not only for workers but also for firms.
One important outcome for firms is what happens to the CEO around the
time of job loss announcements. We examine the role of layoff announcements
in predicting CEO turnover. If the board of directors view job loss announce-
ments as “bad news,” such announcements are likely to increase the prob-
ability of turnover. This coincides with the viewpoint that layoffs are a
signal of impending problems or a CEO’s last-ditch effort to improve firm
profitability. If, on the other hand, reductions in force are seen as a way to
14 Although our CEO data included the year 2000, the definition of the turnover variable required
information for the following year. Thus, the last year in our data was excluded from these regressions.
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make the firm more efficient, they would be expected to decrease the likelihood
of a CEO change. Indeed, information about the firm, the CEO, and the
layoff(s) is likely to provide evidence about whether or not the board of
directors considers layoffs to be welcome. As a similar example, Murphy and
Zimmerman (1993) examine whether CEOs manipulate accounting variables
such as advertising and capital expenditures in order to increase their own
compensation.15 The authors find little evidence that CEOs who are about
to leave exercise such discretion. Rather, their results suggest that changes
in these variables are caused by declining firm performance. It is possible
that layoffs are then not “discretionary,” but instead occur mostly within
struggling firms. The rest of this section is an investigation into whether job
loss announcements benefit the CEO (suggesting that laying off  workers is
a positive self-interested decision), or lead to his or her dismissal.
Baseline Specifications. Table 4 presents results that provide some insight
into the relationship between layoffs and executive turnover. These specifi-
cations mirror equation 1, but add three new indicator variables for whether
any layoff occurred for that firm within the years t − 2, t − 1, and t, respec-
tively. Column 1 contains marginal effects from a logit specification involv-
ing only an indicator for whether there was a layoff in year t. This result
suggests that a firm with at least one layoff is 2.5 percent more likely to have
a new CEO in the following year, clearly supporting the notion that layoffs
are, on average, “bad news” for the CEO and the board. Adding one lag of
the job loss announcement indicator in column 2 does not change this
result, nor does a two-period lag. This result remains significant through all
specifications in Table 4.
Including firm performance, firm size, and CEO characteristics in column 5
decreases the marginal probability of turnover attributable to any layoff in
year t to 1.9 percent. The inclusion of firm-fixed effects (in column 6) further
reduces the impact somewhat, yielding a 1.4 percent higher probability of
turnover resulting from layoff announcements in year t. That is, even con-
trolling for both observed and unobserved characteristics of firms and
CEOs, layoff announcements are significantly related to management turnover.
We examine the robustness of this result in a few ways. First, if  a layoff
announcement that is made when the firm is experiencing poor performance
has a greater effect on turnover, we would expect the coefficient on an inter-
action of the layoff indicator and firm returns to be positive. However, including
interactions for three time periods yielded significant results in only one
15 Healy (1985) examined accounting accruals and bonus contracts, and found that managers do
respond to incentives in bonus contracts, manipulating variables in order to increase their compensation.
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specification for the 1980s. Another factor could be future layoff announce-
ments. To examine whether a CEO change is positively related to future
layoffs, we added leading indicators for the presence of any job loss
announcement to our regressions. In all specifications, the respective coefficients
were insignificant, and did not affect the other variables in any meaningful way.
TABLE 4
L R  P  CEO T I L I
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Any layoff)t 0.025**
(0.016)
0.026**
(0.016)
0.027**
(0.018)
0.021*
(0.054)
0.019** 
(0.027)
0.014** 
(0.035)
(Any layoff)t−1 −0.002 
(0.843)
−0.001 
(0.925)
0.0003 
(0.982)
0.001 
(0.928)
0.001 
(0.915)
(Any layoff)t−2 −0.004
(0.736)
0.0005 
(0.965)
0.002 
(0.794)
0.003 
(0.621)
(Own returns)t −0.051***
(0.000)
−0.039***
(0.000)
−0.027**
(0.000)
(Own returns)t−1 −0.033***
(0.007)
−0.024**
(0.015)
−0.022***
(0.001)
(Own returns)t−2 −0.015 
(0.190)
−0.010 
(0.267)
−0.017***
(0.003)
(Market returns)t 0.030 
(0.155)
0.020 
(0.236)
0.021* 
(0.074)
(Market returns)t−1 −0.009 
(0.658)
−0.010 
(0.524)
0.002 
(0.890)
(Market returns)t−2 0.009 
(0.682)
−0.004 
(0.825)
0.003 
(0.805)
ln(market value) −0.001 
(0.792)
−0.004 
(0.128)
−0.001 
(0.767)
Age 0.045*** 
(0.000)
−0.051***
(0.000)
Age2/1000 −0.285***
(0.000)
0.533*** 
(0.000)
Tenure with firm −0.002** 
(0.045)
−0.001 
(0.578)
(Tenure with firm)2/1000 0.052*** 
(0.005)
0.044*** 
(0.091)
Tenure as CEO 0.004*** 
(0.000)
0.006*** 
(0.000)
(Tenure as CEO)2/1000 −0.118***
(0.001)
−0.162***
(0.000)
Firm indicators Yes
No. of observations 8690 8690 8690 8690 8690 8690
Pseudo R2 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0051 0.1111 0.2520
A CEO change is when there is one CEO with the firm in year t and another in year t + 1.
Marginal effects are reported. p values associated with robust variance estimates for coefficients appear in parentheses.
All logits were run with a constant term.
***significant at the 1 percent level, **significant at the 5 percent level, *significant at the 10 percent level.
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Has the Relationship between Job Loss Announcements and CEO Turnover
Changed over Time? Recent work by Farber and Hallock (2003) provides
(limited) support for the view that layoffs were seen as “bad news” in the 1970s
and 1980s, but have become relatively better news in the 1990s. Perhaps
then layoffs have become less likely to induce CEO turnover in the 1990s.
In an attempt to investigate whether this is true, we separately examine the
three decades in our data. Table 5 contains logit results of CEO turnover
on layoff indicators, firm size and performance, and CEO characteristics for
three separate decades.
Layoffs did not consistently increase the probability of turnover in the
1970s, as some point estimates are positive and others are negative (see
columns 1–3). Columns 4–6 display the results for 1980–1989. In this case,
a layoff  2 years in the past increases the probability of  CEO turnover by
7.8 percent. This result is marginally significant, although markedly weaker
with the inclusion of firm fixed effects in column 6. Furthermore, within
firms, layoffs in the most recent year significantly decreased the likelihood
of CEO turnover. The coefficient estimates for 1990–1999 are contained in
the last three columns of  Table 6. Job loss announcements this year and
in the past do increase the likelihood of turnover across all specifications,
but the coefficients are not significantly different from zero. Thus, we find
evidence that job loss announcements impacted executive turnover in the
1970s and 1980s, but we find no evidence that layoffs were related to the
likelihood of turnover in the 1990s.
Possible Explanations for the CEO Turnover/Job Loss Relationship
Now that we have documented the empirical relationship between job
loss announcements and CEO turnover, we turn to considering some
possible explanations for these findings. We focus on three possible reasons
for the CEO turnover/job loss relationship in this section. The first is
perhaps due to a change in the distribution of reasons for job loss
announcements. The second concerns the response of the board of direc-
tors. The third, which we introduce here but concentrate on more heavily
in section six, involves categorizing layoff  announcements into “good
news” or “bad news,” based on the short-term stock price reactions to the
announcements.
Changes in the Distribution of Reasons for Job Loss Announcements.
Our results suggest that job loss announcements are associated with an
increased likelihood of CEO turnover for the largest firms in the United
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TABLE 5
L R  P  CEO T I L I  D
1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–1999
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Any layoff)t 0.030 0.038* 0.014 0.008 0.002 −0.013** 0.027 0.046 0.002
(0.208) (0.070) (0.272) (0.728) (0.894) (0.044) (0.372) (0.111) (0.351)
(Any layoff)t−1 −0.007 0.010 −0.004 0.003 0.002 −0.007 −0.003 0.002 −0.002
(0.772) (0.661) (0.702) (0.915) (0.930) (0.391) (0.928) (0.502) (0.395)
(Any layoff)t−2 −0.051** −0.029 −0.019** 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.018* −0.042 −0.030 −0.003
(0.033) (0.176) (0.039) (0.003) (0.001) (0.069) (0.173) (0.398) (0.197)
(Own returns)t −0.083*** −0.080*** −0.047*** −0.061** −0.058** −0.020** −0.021 −0.008 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.034) (0.028) (0.025) (0.478) (0.842) (0.716)
(Own returns)t−1 −0.041 −0.049** −0.041*** −0.025 −0.032 −0.015* −0.038 −0.028 0.0003
(0.107) (0.039) (0.001) (0.355) (0.183) (0.090) (0.223) (0.328) (0.924)
(Own returns)t−2 −0.002 −0.007 −0.016 −0.003 −0.010 −0.009 −0.043 −0.043 −0.005**
(0.953) (0.768) (0.126) (0.917) (0.643) (0.243) (0.165) (0.126) (0.029)
(Market returns)t 0.003 0.031 0.024 0.099 0.134* 0.082** −0.025 −0.032 0.003
(0.943) (0.457) (0.200) (0.301) (0.092) (0.012) (0.715) (0.483) (0.508)
(Market returns)t−1 0.014 0.030 0.044*** −0.222** −0.121 −0.004 0.082 0.069 0.006
(0.699) (0.377) (0.002) (0.030) (0.149) (0.896) (0.337) (0.449) (0.192)
(Market returns)t−2 −0.062 −0.039 −0.025 −0.029 0.004 0.032 0.112 0.101 0.008
(0.177) (0.318) (0.152) (0.775) (0.964) (0.303) (0.161) (0.193) (0.114)
ln(market value) −0.006 −0.012* −0.020 −0.019** −0.009 −0.008 0.0001 0.005 −0.001
(0.346) (0.046) (0.089) (0.021) (0.180) (0.480) (0.992) (0.570) (0.701)
CEO characteristicsa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm indicators Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 2457 2457 2457 2266 2266 2266 1652 1652 1652
Pseudo R2 0.0107 0.1300 0.3606 0.0189 0.1294 0.3895 0.0052 0.1017 0.5173
A CEO change is when there is one CEO with the firm in year t and another in year t + 1.
Marginal effects are reported. p values associated with robust variance estimates for coefficients appear in parentheses. All logits were run with a constant term.
***significant at the 1 percent level, **significant at the 5 percent level, *significant at the 10 percent level.
aCEO characteristics include age and its square, seniority with firm and its square, and seniority as CEO and its square.
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States. In an effort to explain this relationship, we examine the characteristics
of these layoffs, as reported in the Wall Street Journal abstracts. Unfortu-
nately, this source does not provide detailed information for all announce-
ments, so we read the full-length articles to gain more detailed information.
Table 6 lists mean layoff characteristics for all firm-year observations where
such information was provided. The percent of employees laid off  is simply
the number of employees laid off  in a given year (perhaps for multiple
layoffs) divided by the total number of employees at the firm (collected from
C). On average, 5.7 percent of employees are laid off in a typical
year, with minimal variation over time. The proportion of layoffs that are
intended to be temporary has changed over time, though. It appears that
27.5 percent of  job loss announcements in the 1970s were planned as
temporary, as compared to only 7.3 percent in the early 1990s. Table 7
considers whether the percent of employees laid off affects CEO turnover. In
column 1, there appears to be a strong effect; firms that lay off  a larger
fraction of their workers have a higher probability of removing the CEO. This
result does not persist when firm fixed effects are considered in column 5,
however.
In Table 6, we also see the distribution of job loss announcements across the
main stated reasons: reorganization, cost control, plant closing, and low
TABLE 6
M L C
All years 1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–1999
Number of layoffs during year 2.033 
(2.626)
2.201 
(2.860)
2.032 
(2.625)
1.792 
(2.240)
Percent employees laid off 0.057 
(0.126)
0.058 
(0.155)
0.056 
(0.121)
0.059 
(0.076)
Percent of annual layoffs that are temporary 0.179 
(0.348)
0.275 
(0.406)
0.156 
(0.321)
0.073 
(0.243)
Percent of annual layoffs for reorganization 0.261 
(0.440)
0.121 
(0.297)
0.194 
(0.370)
0.320 
(0.441)
Percent of annual layoffs for cost control 0.209 
(0.375)
0.186 
(0.357)
0.214 
(0.382)
0.236 
(0.399)
Percent of annual layoffs for plant closing 0.072 
(0.233)
0.082 
(0.246)
0.063 
(0.220)
0.071 
(0.231)
Percent of annual layoffs for low demand 0.374 
(0.444)
0.424 
(0.449)
0.398 
(0.450)
0.268 
(0.413)
Weighted returns at layoffa −0.003 
(0.039)
−0.005 
(0.037)
−0.004 
(0.036)
0.001 
(0.045)
Number of observations 1129 423 412 294
Standard deviations in parentheses.
aAverage excess returns for [1,1] 3-day window around layoff, weighted by inverse variance.
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demand.16 Plant closings and low demand seem to signal serious difficulties
for the firm, while reorganization and cost control appear more positive, at least
at face value. In fact, according to the popular press and many interviews with
senior managers, layoffs have become “good news” in recent years, as they
signify increased efficiency (Hallock, 2003). Apparently reflecting this sentiment,
the proportion of job loss announcements attributable to reorganization and
cost control has increased over time.17 Reorganization is the stated reason
for 12.1 percent of layoffs in the 1970s, but jumps to 32.0 percent of those
in the 1990s. Layoffs categorized for cost control reasons have increased from
18.6 to 23.6 percent over the same time period. As expected, the proportion
of layoffs attributable to plant closings and low demand has decreased from
16 These were originally collected as 18 different reported reasons, and we have combined many of
them for simplicity.
17 Section six investigates share price reactions to these layoff announcements.
TABLE 7
L R  P  CEO T I L C
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Any layoff)t 0.009 
(0.319)
0.014 
(0.146)
0.016*
(0.061)
0.012 
(0.228)
0.011 
(0.194)
(Any layoff)t−1 0.0004 
(0.967)
0.001 
(0.913)
−0.0001
(0.987)
0.0013 
(0.882)
0.001 
(0.826)
(Any layoff)t−2 0.001 
(0.874)
0.002 
(0.859)
0.002 
(0.820)
0.003 
(0.753)
0.004 
(0.564)
Percent employees laid off 0.098**
(0.025)
0.072 
(0.159)
0.036 
(0.552)
Percent employees missing 0.030 
(0.216)
0.019 
(0.382)
0.020 
(0.188)
Number of layoffs in year 0.001 
(0.561)
−0.003 
(0.345)
−0.002 
(0.510)
Wtd returns*(any layoff) −0.348*
(0.075)
−0.287*
(0.092)
−0.240*
(0.069)
Wtd returns*(any layoff)t−1 0.316 
(0.114)
0.277 
(0.124)
0.152 
(0.290)
Wtd returns*(any layoff)t−2 −0.112 
(0.614)
−0.068 
(0.723)
−0.094 
(0.511)
SIC codes Yes Yes
Firm indicators Yes
No. of observations 8690 8690 8690 8690 8690
Pseudo R2 0.1119 0.1121 0.1496 0.1509 0.2531
A CEO change is when there is one CEO with the firm in year t and another in year t + 1.
Marginal effects are reported. p values associated with robust variance estimates for coefficients appear in parentheses.
All logits were run with a constant term.
Additional covariates are as in Table 5 column 5; returns, ln(market value), and CEO characteristics are included.
***significant at the 1 percent level, **significant at the 5 percent level, *significant at the 10 percent level.
aWtd returns are average excess returns for [1,1] 3-day window around layoff, weighted by inverse variance.
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the 1970s to the 1990s. This suggests that over time job loss announcements
have had the appearance of being more positive for firms, and thus are
perhaps less likely to adversely affect top management. In that case, our
earlier result that layoffs are related to CEO turnover in the future seems
puzzling, but potential explanations are possible. These are explored in
additional logit analyses (not reported in the tables). The stated reasons for
layoffs do not seem to have a significant influence on CEO turnover probabilities.
The Boards’ Response to Job Loss Announcements. Our results suggest
that layoffs are significantly related to CEO changes, but that the actual
changes may happen slowly, as we found for the 1980s. Some possible
reasons for this do not directly involve layoff announcements. For instance,
it is possible that CEOs who are entrenched in their firms are less likely to
leave than regular workers? CEOs who are founders are a prime example of
this, as are CEOs who own a large proportion of the company’s stock.18 In
either scenario, the board would have a fair amount of difficulty removing
a CEO quickly.19 An additional possibility is that some new CEOs have
been hired in order to make the firm more efficient by laying off  employees
and taking other cost-cutting measures. Thus, new CEOs (those in their first
two years of tenure) may be particularly less likely to turnover when they
announce mass layoffs. The inclusion of interaction terms for new CEOs
and layoff announcements yielded consistently insignificant results, and did
not impact the other parameters. A similar argument pertains to CEOs
hired from outside the firm. Additional variables to measure this potential
impact contribute one interesting result: in some specifications, CEOs hired
from the outside were more likely to turnover due to layoffs in the 1970s,
and the opposite was true for some 1980s specifications. This provides some
evidence that, starting in the 1980s, CEOs may have been hired into the firm
in order to generate layoffs and make the firm more efficient.
Stock Returns. Another explanation is that job loss announcements do
not signal potential profitability as clearly as stock returns do. It stands to
reason that a fair amount of time would pass between the rank-and-file
being laid off and the CEO being dismissed. Perhaps in these circumstances,
firms require several years to find a new CEO who can turn the company
around. Nonetheless, the previous discussion of stated layoff reasons provides
18 Unfortunately, our data do not include these characteristics, but further work could examine the
role of these factors in CEO turnover for this time period.
19 It would also be interesting to study the career patterns of top managers, and see whether this is
related to layoffs. Two papers that have recently studied career patterns are Fee and Hadlock (2004) and
Hayes, Oyer, and Shaefer (2003).
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another possible explanation. If  layoffs have the expressed purpose of re-
organization or controlling costs, the initial response of the board is likely
to be favorable. Then, if  time passes and performance does not significantly
improve, the board will look to replace top management. Our results appear
to be consistent with this explanation. We now turn to a more detailed
examination of the stock price reaction to job loss announcements and the
subsequent effect on CEO turnover.
Does the Short-term Stock Price Reaction to Job Loss 
Announcements Help to Explain CEO Turnover?
Determining whether a job loss announcement is good news or bad news
for the firm is particularly difficult, even with the wealth of data we have. It
seems reasonable to investigate whether the short-term stock price reaction
to job loss announcements influences the probability of CEO turnover as
stock prices are such an important metric in firms. For example, perhaps
firms that announce layoffs that are perceived as “good news” (e.g. a very
clever reorganization) are likely to retain their CEOs because of the good
work that they have done. On the other hand, CEOs that authorize layoffs
that are perceived as “bad news” may subsequently lose their jobs.
In this section, we investigate this idea by augmenting our typical logit
specifications (from Tables 4 and 5) by including an interaction term
between weighted 3-day stock price reactions to job loss announcements
over the year and the layoff indicators described previously.20 First, we will
describe our methods for estimating stock price reactions.
The methods we use here are widely known in the corporate finance field
(e.g. Fama et al., 1969, and Cambell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997), and we
only outline the method here. Clearly defining event dates is certainly
crucial, and we define an event as happening on the day it was reported in
the Wall Street Journal.
Let t index time in trading days, e indicate the day of the layoff announce-
ment, and f index firms. Then using value-weighted return data from the
CRSP at the University of Chicago, Rft, the daily return for firm f, is
regressed on Rmt, the value weighted market return on day t. This regression,
Rf t = α f + β fR mt + εft, (2)
20 Because firms can make multiple announcements in a given year, we have taken the weighted
average of all  three-day returns for the firms in the year where the weights are the inverse of the variance
of the returns (see succeeding discussions).
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is estimated from day e—60 to day e—30. Then for the days around day e,
we calculate the daily abnormal or excess return,
ERft = Rft − (1f + 2fRmt), (3)
where 1f and 2f are estimated in equation 2. The excess return can be
considered the part of  the movement in the stock return of  firm f that is
not correlated with the overall market movements, and therefore reflects
unexpected firm-specific factors. The three-day cumulative announcements
that we use are computed by summing the returns on days e − 1, e, and
e + 1. We then generate weighted averages of these by firm-year, using the
inverse of the variance as weights. Thus, each firm, in each year, has a single
weighted share price reaction value.
It is clear from Table 7 that the stock price reaction to employee layoffs
impacts CEO turnover. That is, there is a strong and significant effect such
that higher stock price reactions to layoff announcements yield lower prob-
abilities of CEO turnover. This effect persists in three distinct cases: across
firms and industries, within industries, and within firms. Table 8 shows that
much of this effect is to the result of a substantial relationship in the 1970s.
Within firms, higher returns are associated with significantly lower turnover,
while the relationship across firms is positive, suggesting that layoffs with
more positive reactions induce more CEO turnover one year in the future. On
the other hand, the effects of stock price reactions in the 1980s and 1990s
are rarely significantly different from zero. In the 1980s, the previously
estimated positive effect of layoff announcements two years ago remains,
and some additional layoff characteristics are also significant. For instance,
within firms, more announcements and larger layoffs imply lower turnover.
Table 8 also displays some evidence counter to the conventional wisdom
that job loss announcements were relatively “good” news in the 1990s.
Specifically, the mere presence of layoffs did not significantly (negatively)
impact turnover, and CEOs who laid off  more employees were relatively
more likely to leave the firm.
Concluding Comments
The main goal of this work is to investigate the basic relationship between
job loss announcements and turnover of top management. It begins by
documenting that job loss announcements seem to be related to certain
CEO and firm characteristics. For example, in the cross section, it appears
that CEOs are more likely to turnover, and that larger firms (by many
accounts) experience more job loss announcements. The paper goes on to
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TABLE 8
L R  P  CEO T I L C  D
1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–1999
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Any layoff)t 0.014 0.007 0.002 0.028 0.042* 0.012 0.010 0.005 0.003
(0.568) (0.769) (0.908) (0.283) (0.078) (0.285) (0.759) (0.878) (0.727)
(Any layoff)t−1 0.016 0.011 −0.001 0.009 0.0004 −0.004 −0.002 −0.004 −0.003
(0.483) (0.618) (0.926) (0.649) (0.983) (0.659) (0.950) (0.869) (0.296)
(Any layoff)t−2 −0.033 −0.028 −0.020** 0.080*** 0.053** 0.017* −0.032 −0.037 −0.003
(0.140) (0.171) (0.028) (0.001) (0.009) (0.066) (0.261) (0.168) (0.200)
Percent employees laid off 0.085 0.118 0.107 0.041 −0.088 −0.127** 0.496* 0.564* 0.035
(0.320) (0.215) (0.184) (0.717) (0.313) (0.017) (0.057) (0.065) (0.174)
Percent employees missing 0.082 0.070 0.036 0.001 −0.028 −0.008 0.032 0.007 0.003
(0.139) (0.162) (0.172) (0.990) (0.387) (0.501) (0.749) (0.950) (0.798)
Number of  layoffs in year 0.001 0.003 −0.001 −0.016* −0.027*** −0.013*** −0.001 −0.005 −0.001
(0.786) (0.611) (0.788) (0.067) (0.006) (0.004) (0.941) (0.664) (0.218)
Wtd returns*(any layoff) −0.544 −0.596 −0.547** −0.111 −0.016 0.070 −0.303 −0.203 0.031
(0.207) (0.116) (0.023) (0.826) (0.969) (0.737) (0.530) (0.604) (0.731)
Wtd returns*(any layoff)t−1 0.981** 0.811* 0.260 0.634 0.799* 0.438* 0.724 0.272 0.008
(0.031) (0.052) (0.315) (0.195) (0.050) (0.090) (0.234) (0.642) (0.755)
Wtd returns*(any layoff)t−2 0.207 0.086 −0.090 0.028 0.093 0.113 0.164 −0.197 0.0004
(0.721) (0.863) (0.748) (0.956) (0.830) (0.599) (0.856) (0.791) (0.968)
SIC codes Yes Yes Yes
Firm indicators Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 2457 2457 2457 2266 2266 2266 1652 1652 1652
Pseudo R2 0.1336 0.1951 0.3657 0.1316 0.2063 0.3998 0.1049 0.1905 0.5194
A CEO change is when there is one CEO with the firm in year t and another in year t + 1.
Marginal effects are reported. p values associated with robust variance estimates for coefficients appear in parentheses. All logits were run with a constant term.
Additional covariates are as in Table 5 column 5; returns, ln(market value), and CEO characteristics are included.
***significant at the 1 percent level, **significant at the 5 percent level, *significant at the 10 percent level.
aWtd returns are average excess returns for [1,1] 3-day window around layoff, weighted by inverse variance.
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investigate the relationship between firm and market performance and CEO
turnover. Consistent with a host of  previous authors and with simple
principal-agent models, we find that own stock price performance is negatively
related to management turnover and that market performance is positively
related. We also document that the relationship between returns and turnover
varies over time.
We then investigated the relationship between announcements of job loss
and management turnover and found mixed results, suggesting that CEOs
are likely to turnover some time after their firm announces a layoff. We
explored several dynamic specifications including leads and lags of perfor-
mance and the layoff indicator variables, and this result seems robust.
The fact that there is a relationship between mass layoff announcements
and CEO turnover is interesting in light of Hallock’s (1998) finding that job
loss announcements did not lead to higher CEO pay. Although he used data
from only the late 1980s through the mid-1990s, he found that, in the cross
section, firms making layoff announcements paid their managers more. This
result did not remain when he controlled for observed and unobserved CEO
and firm characteristics. In our case, the mass layoff/CEO turnover result
seems to be robust to a similar careful empirical test. More importantly,
neither study supports the notion that layoffs have positive effects on CEOs.
We attempted to investigate several possible explanations for this
relationship. It seems that the most promising is the “share price reaction”
analysis. We have strong evidence that layoffs that are associated with
negative stock price reactions are much more likely to lead to CEO turnover
than layoffs associated with positive stock price reactions, especially earlier
in the sample.
We would recommend several directions for future work in this area. It
might be useful to further investigate the characteristics of the job loss
announcements. We also think it is important to more deeply investigate
“corporate control” issues, such as whether entrenchment of the board may
protect the CEO from being removed in the face of large job cuts in firms.
In addition, although we control for market performance and year effects,
it would be useful to examine whether the business cycle has a direct impact
on our findings. We hope that our work in a useful first-step in this area.
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